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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Privacy is not something that I’m merely entitled to, it’s an absolute 
prerequisite.”1       -Marlon Brando 
                                                                
1DAVID SHIPMAN, MARLON BRANDO (1974, revised 1989), available at 
http://www.bartleby.com/66/59/8159.html. 
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Virtually every member of American society has seen a physician and therefore 
has some type of medical history.  A medical history contains some of the most 
intimate details of a person’s life.2  This information might not even be shared with 
intimate partners, family or friends,3 perhaps because an individual is usually private, 
in denial of an illness, or wishes to guard loved ones from painful information. 
Whatever the reason, it is reasonable to conclude that most individuals wish to keep 
health information personal and private.   
The desire to keep medical information private has been recognized for centuries, 
as evidenced by the Hippocratic Oath4 and the common law physician-patient 
privilege.5  As healthcare changes, so too must societal conceptions of medical 
privacy.  Today, medical privacy encompasses not only privileged communications, 
but also the power to control medical records and who may access them.  Preserving 
this power can appropriately be termed protecting medical records privacy.   
Unfortunately, three issues threaten the long-recognized right to medical privacy.  
First, while the increased use of technology to store and transmit medical records 
makes accessing private health information easier for authorized medical personnel, 
it also increases the likelihood that the information may be seen and used by those 
with ill intentions.  Second, the Privacy Rule promulgated under the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”)6 actually sanctions 
the non-consensual disclosure of personal health information.7  Third, privacy rights 
are eroding as a result of measures taken to increase national security in the wake of 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  The erosion of privacy rights is illustrated 
by the hastily passed USA PATRIOT Act,8 which alters the interpretation of many 
privacy oriented statutes and effectively contracts individual privacy rights.9  These 
                                                                
2Kevin B. Davis, Privacy Rights in Personal Information: HIPAA and the Privacy Gap 
Between Fundamental Privacy Rights and Medical Information, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER 
& INFO. L. 535, 537 (2001) (citing Board of Med. Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 93 Cal. 
App. 3d 669, 678 (1979)). 
3Peter P. Swire & Lauren B. Steinfield, Modern Studies in Privacy Law: National Health 
Information Privacy Regulations Under HIPAA: Security and Privacy After September 11: 
The Health Care Example, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1526-27 (2002).   
4STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 799, cited in Mike Hatch, Modern Studies in Privacy 
Law: National Health Information Privacy Regulations Under HIPAA: Commercial Interests 
Win Round Two, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1489 (2002).  
5Lawrence O. Gostin and James G. Hodge, Jr., Piercing the Veil of Secrecy in HIV:  AIDS 
and Other Sexually Transmitted Diseases: Theories or Privacy and Disclosure in Partner 
Notification, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 9, 42 – 44 (1998).  
6Pub. L. No. 104-191 (1996) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 201).   
7Compliance with the Privacy Rule is required no later than April 14, 2003 for “covered 
entities” except “small health plans.”  “Small health plans” must comply with the Rule by 
April 14, 2004.  45 C.F.R. §164.534.  See also 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462.  A “small health plan” has 
annual receipts of less than $5 million.  45 C.F.R. §160.104.    
8Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (Act of 2001) (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
115 Stat. 272 (2001).  
9Swire & Steinfield, supra note 3, at 1521-22.   
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three factors have converged to threaten an individual’s right to medical records 
privacy.   
Proceeding from the proposition that privacy is a fundamental right, this essay 
notes the importance of maintaining medical records privacy in light of the increased 
use of technology.  It describes the Privacy Rule promulgated under HIPAA, which 
was intended to strengthen medical records privacy, but notes the restriction of 
privacy rights following September 11, 2001 (“9/11”).  In light of circumscribed 
privacy rights, the Privacy Rule becomes much more important in protecting medical 
records privacy.  Unfortunately, the Rule falls short of this goal by potentially 
running afoul of the First and Fourth Amendments.  It also fails to provide adequate 
medical records protection because it: (1) relies on an out of date technology model; 
(2) provides too many exceptions to its own consensual disclosure provisions; (3) 
lacks specificity in defining the entities it covers; (4) fails to resolve important 
federalism issues; and (5) caters to corporate interests.  These problems can be 
corrected by bolstering computer security, changing the text of the Rule to anchor a 
patient’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” and offering the judiciary an avenue to 
continue to expand privacy rights despite the nation’s post-9/11 fears.  
II.  PRIVACY IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
“[T]he makers of our Constitution conferred, as against the government, 
the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right 
most valued by civilized men.”10   -Justice Louis Brandeis 
While the Constitution does not explicitly grant the right to privacy, the United 
States Supreme Court has recognized this guarantee.11  One of the earliest 
recognitions of the right to privacy came in the 1891 decision of Union Pacific 
Railway v. Botsford.12  Finding that an injured woman could not be required to 
submit to a surgical examination to determine the extent of her injuries, the Supreme 
Court noted that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded . . . 
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, 
free from all restraint or interference of others . . . .”13   
The 1928 decision of Olmstead v. United States formally tied privacy rights to 
the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.14  
Justice Brandeis noted in his dissent that the drafters of the Constitution, in an effort 
to allow for the pursuit of happiness and to protect the beliefs of Americans, 
“conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone.”15  That right, he 
asserted, was promulgated in the text of the Fourth Amendment.16  Similarly, in the 
                                                                
10Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).  
11James G. Hodge, Jr., National Health Information Privacy and New Federalism, 14 ND 
J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y. 791, 797 (2000).   
12141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
13Id. 
14Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478. 
15Id. 
16Id. 
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1965 decision of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas noted that the penumbral 
zones of privacy stem from the emanations of the Fourth Amendment “right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”17  In light of these decisions, privacy may appropriately be 
regarded as a fundamental right with a substantial historic pedigree.   
Unfortunately, the right to privacy is limited and poorly defined because it 
emanates from the penumbras of the Fourth Amendment, and is therefore easily 
subject to transgression.18  The right faces further limitation from other social 
interests, such as the need for openness and transparency or other compelling State 
interests, which are often balanced against it.19  
Ferguson v. City of Charleston recently addressed the balance between medical 
privacy and State interests.20  In response to the increased use of cocaine by 
expectant mothers, The Medical University of South Carolina (“MUSC”) began 
screening urine samples of maternity patients suspected of drug use.21  Under MUSC 
policy, if a patient tested positive for cocaine use during labor or a prenatal care visit, 
medical staff threatened to report the patient’s drug use to law enforcement 
officials.22  The patient could avoid criminal sanctions by enrolling in a substance 
abuse program.23   
The Supreme Court found for the Plaintiffs, stating that MUSC had violated the 
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure.24  In 
deciding the case the Court noted that MUSC was subject to the Fourth Amendment 
because it was a state hospital.25  It also identified the well-settled principle of law 
that urine tests are considered searches under the Fourth Amendment.26  Balancing 
the patients’ Fourth Amendment privacy interests against the “special needs” of the 
hospital, the Court concluded that the tests were an unreasonable search in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment.27  The Court also noted that a patient’s “reasonable 
                                                                
17Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
18Kevin B. Davis, Privacy Rights in Personal Information: HIPAA and the Privacy Gap 
Between Fundamental Privacy Rights and Medical Information, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER 
& INFO. L. 535, 538 (Summer 2001). 
19Marc Rotenberg, Modern Studies in Privacy Law: Foreward: Privacy and Secrecy After 
September 11, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1127 (June 2002).  
20532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
21Samples were screened if a patient met one or more of the following criteria: (1) no 
prenatal care; (2) late prenatal care after 24 weeks gestation; (3) incomplete prenatal care; (4) 
abruptio placentae; (5) intrauterine fetal death; (6) preterm labor ‘of no obvious cause’; (7) 
IUGR (intrauterine growth retardation) ‘of no obvious cause;’ (8) previously known drug or 
alcohol abuse; and (9) unexplained congenital anomalies.  Id. at 72. 
22Ferguson at 72. 
23Id. 
24Id. at 85. 
25Id. at 76.   
26Ferguson at 76.  
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expectation of privacy” is that the results of diagnostic tests will not be shared with 
non-medical personnel without her consent.28   
While privacy rights prevailed in Ferguson, the balancing test employed 
illustrates that the extent of privacy rights may not be well-settled.  Nevertheless, 
previous Supreme Court decisions indicate that privacy may appropriately be 
regarded as a fundamental right.29  This treatment is justified; for without privacy an 
individual’s medical records might be used to deny credit, employment, or insurance 
coverage.30  Similarly, without privacy rights a person would be subject to being 
embarrassed by neighbors and stigmatized or humiliated by friends and relatives.31  
The right to privacy is therefore co-extensive with protecting individual dignity and 
fulfills an essential role of individual autonomy and a free society.32  To protect 
individual dignity, preserve personal security and allow for the pursuit of happiness, 
privacy must encompass not only ‘the right to be let alone,’ but also the right to 
control the release of personal and private information.33   
III.  MEDICAL RECORDS PRIVACY IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE 
“All that may come to my knowledge in the exercise of my profession or 
outside of my profession or in daily commerce with men, which ought not 
to be spread abroad, I will keep secret and will never reveal.”34  
                                                                                  -The Hippocratic Oath 
The right to privacy is of paramount importance in the medical records context 
because medical records contain highly sensitive information about what are 
potentially the most intimate details of an individual’s life.35  Medical records often 
contain demographic information such as age, sex, race, marital status, children, and 
occupation; financial information, such as employment status, income, and methods 
of payment; personal identifiers other than name, including social security number, 
addresses, and phone numbers; and information about why treatment is sought, such 
as being the victim of a violent crime, firearm injury, or the at-fault party in an auto 
accident.36  They also contain information identifying whether an individual has a 
                                                          
27The “special needs” asserted by the state were its’ interest in curtailing the pregnancy 
costs and medical complications resulting from maternal cocaine use.  Ferguson at 78.  
28Ferguson at 78.   
29Mike Hatch, Modern Studies in Privacy Law: National Health Information Privacy 
Regulations Under HIPAA: Commercial Interests Win Round Two, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 
1487 (2002).  
30Id.  
31Id. at 1486. 
32Id. 
33Samuel D. Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 
(1890).     
34STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 799, cited in Hatch, supra note 29, at 1489.  
35Davis, supra note 18, at 537. 
36Hodge, supra note 11, at 791.   
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communicable or other disease, or a particular genetic propensity.37  When 
aggregated, this information reveals a great deal about the intimate details of a 
person’s life.38  It also creates a profile of a person that may be used for 
discriminatory purposes such as denying credit, employment, or insurance 
coverage.39  
Changes in the healthcare industry have coalesced to de-emphasize medical 
records security and make health information a commodity.  As medical records are 
increasingly stored and transmitted in electronic media40 unauthorized disclosures or 
security breaches have become more frequent.41  The centralized storage of medical 
records also allows individuals to be identified in reverse.42  By searching based on 
diseases rather than names, it is possible to create lists of people with specific 
medical conditions.43  Employers with access to health identifiers and database 
information can use these lists to wrongfully discriminate and deny jobs based on the 
projected cost of a pre-existing medical condition to the company’s health plan.44  
Participants in the healthcare industry may also use this information to learn about 
individuals who use their products or are affected by a particular medical condition.45  
They may then use this information in unsolicited marketing efforts.46   
Consider too the number of people who potentially see part or all of a patient’s 
medical record during a typical hospital stay.  Once a patient is admitted to a 
hospital, information is gathered and disseminated to a multitude of entities,47 
including regulatory agencies, accreditation bodies, government departments, 
insurance providers, data warehouse and storage facilities, researchers, billing and 
accounting, third party benefit managers, marketers, insurers, and in some cases, 
even employers.48  This is to say nothing of the multitude of healthcare employees 
who view an individual’s personal health information in the course of treatment, or 
                                                                
37Id. 
38Jerry Berman, The Federal Trade Commission’s Report to Congress- ‘Privacy Online: 
Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace,’ testimony before the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, May 25, 2000, available at 
www.cdt.org/testimony/000525berman.shtml (last visited Feb. 17, 2002, on file with author).  
39Hatch, supra note 29, at 1490.   
40Davis, supra note 18, at 539. 
41Hatch, supra note 29, 1491.   
42Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National Identification 
Systems, 15 HARV. J. LAW & TEC. 319, 358 (Spring 2002).   
43Id. 
44Id. 
45Davis, supra note 18, at 539. 
46Id. 
47Charity Scott, Is Too Much Privacy Bad For Your Health?: A Introduction to the Law, 
Ethics, and HIPAA Rule On Medical Privacy, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 481, 484 (2000). 
48Davis, supra note 18, at 544-45.  The HHS regulations prohibit the use of health 
information by employers for job related decisions.   
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the ease of access to computer terminals within the hospital setting.  By some 
estimates, over four hundred people are likely to see part or all of a patient’s medical 
record during a typical hospital stay.49   
The decrease in medical records privacy creates not only the potential for 
unwarranted and possibly illegal misuse or discrimination by healthcare providers, 
insurance companies, employers and marketplace participants; it may also adversely 
affect the quality of care.  A 1999 survey conducted by the California HealthCare 
Foundation indicated that the public has reacted to the perceived decrease in medical 
records privacy by engaging in privacy-protective behavior to shield themselves 
from harmful and intrusive uses of health information.50  This behavior included 
withholding information from healthcare providers, providing inaccurate 
information, doctor-hopping to avoid a consolidated medical record, paying out-of-
pocket for care that is covered by insurance and, in the most extreme cases, avoiding 
care altogether.51  The survey also showed that one in five persons believe that their 
personal health information had been compromised and used inappropriately, and 
that one in six engaged in some form of the previously described privacy protective 
conduct.52  Similarly, a Harris Equifax survey showed that over 80% of the public 
respondents felt they had “lost all control” over their personal information.53  “This 
has led some members of the health care industry to state that medical record privacy 
is not just failing, it is ‘non-existent.’”54 
IV.  HIPAA: THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO THREATENED MEDICAL RECORDS 
PRIVACY 
“Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty 
when the government’s purposes are beneficent. . . .  The greatest dangers 
to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning 
but without understanding.”55    -Justice Louis Brandeis 
Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(“HIPAA”) to promote the use of technology in the medical field and to standardize 
                                                                
49Davis, supra note 18, at 544.  
50California HealthCare Foundation, National Survey: Confidentiality of Medical Records 
(Oakland: CHCF, Jan. 1999), cited in Janlori Goldman and Zoe Hudson, Virtually Exposed: 
Privacy and E-Health; Privacy concerns are keeping consumers from reaping the full benefit 
of online health information, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov/Dec 2000.   
51Id. 
52Id. 
53Lawrence O. Gostin, James G. Hodge, Jr. and Mira S. Burghardt, Balancing Communal 
Goods and Personal Privacy Under a National Health Informational Privacy Rule, 46 ST. 
LOUIS J.L. 5, 6 (Winter 2002).   
54Davis, supra note 18, at 544.  
55Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479.   
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and streamline medical records.56  The proposed changes were designed to improve 
patient care, ameliorate the healthcare system’s administrative inefficiencies, and 
decrease costs through the free flow of information.57  These “administrative 
simplification” provisions included the creation of a Uniform Health Identifier 
(UHID) and a “national electronic collection system for personal health care data.”58   
Recognizing that free flowing medical information and a UHID would reduce 
privacy by making information available to those who could access the records 
storage system, Congress required that medical records privacy legislation be passed 
by August 21, 1999.59  Congress failed to pass that legislation and, pursuant to the 
HIPAA mandate, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) was authorized to pass privacy regulations.60 
HHS issued a proposed Privacy Rule in November of 1999, at which time over 
50,000 public comments were received.61  These comments reflected concern over 
the impact of the Rule on the healthcare industry, illustrated confusion and 
misunderstanding over how it would operate, and expressed apprehension about its 
complexity.62  Several thousand additional comments were received when President 
Bush re-opened the comment period in efforts to re-assess regulations enacted late in 
former-President Clinton’s term.63  Despite the concerns enunciated in the 
comments, President Bush announced in April of 2001 that the Privacy Rule would 
go into effect essentially as drafted, requiring compliance after April 2003.64   
                                                                
56Rob Cunningham, Old Before Its Time: HIPAA and E-Health Policy; A Law that 
Predates the Internet Explosion Needs Retrofitting to Serve as a Foundation for Standardized 
Data Exchange, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov/Dec 2000.  
57Id.  See also Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifable Health Information, 65 
Fed. Reg. 82462 (Dec. 28, 2000); Andrew S. Krulwich and Bruce L. McDonald, The 
Vulnerability of HIPAA Regulations to First and Fourth Amendment Attack: An Addendum to 
“Evolving Constitutional Privacy Doctrines Affecting Healthcare Enterprises,” 56 FOOD 
DRUG L.J. 281, 282-83 (2001).   
58Sobel, supra note 42, at 325. While the idea of a UHID has “acquired the aura of a third 
rail,” it indicates that if the administrative simplification provisions “are not refashioned, 
federal policy will fall further behind events.”  Off-the-record interview with HHS official, 
June 20, 2000 cited in Cunningham, supra note 56.    
59Gostin et al., supra note 53, at 15. 
60HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 264(c)(1) (1996), cited in Gostin et al., supra note 53, at 
15.  
61Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Protecting the Privacy 
of Patients’ Health Information (May 9, 2001), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/ 
final/pvcfact2.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2003, on file with author), cited in Gostin et al., supra 
note 55, at 15.  
62Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. at 
53182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164).  
63Robert Pear, Bush Accepts Rules to Protect Privacy of Medical Records, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 12, 2001, at A1, cited in Gostin et al., supra note 53, at 15, n.53.  
64Swire & Steinfeld, supra note 3, at 1524.  
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The Privacy Rule begins by defining “health information,”65 then explicitly 
governs a subset of that information known as “protected health information” 
(“PHI”).66  PHI includes individually identifiable information transmitted and 
maintained electronically or in any other form or media.67  This includes, for 
example, information containing a name, Social Security Number, driver’s license 
number, fingerprint, or genetic link.68  The information may be categorized as “de-
identified” and no longer subject to the Rule upon finding a “very small” risk of 
subject identification or upon removal of a specified list of identifiers.69  Also, truly 
non-identifiable information is not subject to the Rule because there are no privacy 
implications.70 
The Privacy Rule applies only to “covered entities,” defined as health care 
providers, health plans, and healthcare clearinghouses.71  The Rule requires, inter 
alia, that they provide notice of their information practices,72 use and disclose PHI 
only with patient permission except in cases of designated exceptions,73 permit 
patients to access and request correction of their records,74 and provide patients an 
accounting of PHI disclosure.75  “Covered entities” must also limit the use and 
disclosure of PHI to the minimum necessary amount,76 implement security 
                                                                
65Public Welfare General Administrative Requirements, 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2003).  
Health information means any information, whether written or oral or recorded in any form or 
medium that: (1) is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, public health 
authority, employer, life insurer, school or university, or health care clearinghouse; and (2) 
relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual; 
the provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the 
provision of health care to an individual.   
66Id.  
67Id. 
68Public Welfare Security and Privacy, 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i) (2003). 
6945 C.F.R. § 164.514(b).  These identifiers include names, geographic subdivisions 
smaller than a State, all elements of dates relating to an individual (e.g. those that indicate the 
patient’s age), telephone numbers, fax numbers, e-mail addresses, Social Security Numbers, 
medical record numbers, health plan beneficiary numbers, account numbers, certificate or 
license numbers, vehicle identifiers, device identifiers, URLs, IP (Internet Provider) address 
numbers, biometric identifiers such as finger and voice prints, full face photographic images, 
and any other unique identifying number, characteristic or code, supra.   
70Gostin et al., supra note 53, at 17-18. 
7145 C.F.R. § 160.103(3).   
7245 C.F.R. § 164.520(a)(1). 
7345 C.F.R. § 164.512. 
7445 C.F.R. § 164.526(a). 
7545 C.F.R. § 164.528(a)(1). 
76[A] covered entity must make reasonable efforts to limit protected health information to 
the minimum necessary to accomplish the intended purpose of the use, disclosure, or request.  
45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(1).   
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safeguards to protect against unauthorized access or disclosure,77 and obtain 
satisfactory assurances, via a written contract, that their business associates using 
PHI protect the privacy of the information.78 
The Rule was intended to enhance patient autonomy and promote trust in the 
health care system.79  It ostensibly increases the accountability of “covered entities” 
by allowing patients to access certain information contained in their files and by 
regulating the covered entities’ use of PHI.80  It should also bridge the gap between 
the privacy interests articulated by the Supreme Court and the personal health 
information that people might choose to keep out of the public domain.81   
Critics however, have described the Privacy Rule as a “regulatory oxymoron.”82  
While intended to protect the privacy of personal health information, the Rule 
actually sanctions non-consensual disclosure in certain instances.83  For instance, 
PHI may be disclosed without patient consent: to public health authorities to prevent 
or control disease or to report child abuse or neglect;84 to the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) to report “adverse events” and biological product deviations, 
to track products, or to conduct post marketing surveillance;85 to a person who may 
have been exposed to a communicable disease or who is at risk of spreading the 
disease;86 and to employers regarding evaluation of the workplace, a work related 
illness, or workplace medical surveillance.87  The Rule also allows nonconsensual 
disclosure of PHI about victims of abuse, neglect or domestic violence,88 or for 
oversight of the healthcare system, government benefit programs, entities subject to 
government regulatory programs, or entities subject to civil rights laws.89  Because 
the Privacy Rule sanctions the non-consensual disclosure of PHI, it may 
appropriately be viewed as a threat to medical records privacy. 
                                                                
7745 C.F.R. § 164.530(c)(2). 
7845 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(2).   
79Gostin et al., supra note 53, at 21.  
80Davis, supra note 18, at 537.  
81Id.  
82Hatch, supra note 29, at 1483.  
83Id. 
8445 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(i) & (ii). 
8545 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(iii). 
8645 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(iv). 
8745 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(v). 
88Id. 
8945 C.F.R. § 164.512(d)(1). 
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V.  PRIVACY RIGHTS ARE CIRCUMSCRIBED IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD 
“They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety 
deserve neither liberty nor safety.”90               -Benjamin Franklin 
The United States Supreme Court had been expanding privacy rights prior to the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, but the penumbral zones of privacy 
constricted following those tragic events.91  For example, privacy rights prevailed in 
the pre-9/11 Ferguson case as the Court noted that a patient has a reasonable 
expectation that the results of diagnostic tests will not be disclosed to non-medical 
personnel without patient consent.92  Similarly, in Kyllo v. United States the Court 
found that law enforcement’s use of thermal-imaging to scan an individual’s home 
violated the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.93  Public opinion prior to 9/11 also supported expanded privacy rights, as a 
Wall Street Journal poll found that Americans ranked the “erosion of personal 
privacy” as one of the most serious issues in the upcoming century.94   
Following 9/11, priorities clearly changed, as security issues moved to the fore of 
the public mind.95  Post-9/11 polls indicating greater concern for public safety and a 
noticeably lower concern for privacy issues illustrate this change.96  Public opinion 
increasingly supported new forms of surveillance, including biometric identifiers97 
and a national ID card.98  Concomitantly, the momentum towards increasing 
individual privacy quickly shifted towards protecting national security through 
greater surveillance powers than would have been proposed only a year earlier.99   
The passage of the USA Patriot Act exemplifies the declining importance of 
individual privacy.  Its provisions grant broad and often unchecked discretion to law 
enforcement officials.  For example, rather than requiring a new search warrant for 
each phone or computer, law enforcement officials may now access communications 
from any device used by a suspect.100  Similarly, the Act increases the scope of 
                                                                
90HISTORICAL REVIEW OF PENNSYLVANIA, available at http://www.bartleby.com/ 
100/245.1.html#245.note2 (last visited Feb. 17, 2003).  
91Andrew S. Krulwich and Bruce L. McDonald, The Vulnerability of HIPAA Regulations 
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Doctrines Affecting Healthcare Enterprises,” 56 FOOD DRUG L.J. 281, 303 (2001).   
92Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001). 
93Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
94Swire & Steinfeld, supra note 3, at 1515. 
95Id. 
96Id. at 1515-16. 
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§164.514(b)(2)(i)(P). 
98Rotenberg, supra note 19, at 1115.  
99Swire & Steinfeld, supra note 3, at 1516. 
100This power is referred to as a “roving wire-tap.”  See, Swire & Steinfeld, supra note 3, 
at 1521. 
282 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 17:271 
emergency orders used to trace communications,101 which generally apply before a 
judge approves a court order.102  The Act also provides that one court order may be 
used for tracing communications nationwide, rather than requiring a new order in 
each jurisdiction a communications provider operates.103   
The USA PATRIOT Act also changes the interpretation of many privacy oriented 
statutes, which effectively restricts individual privacy rights.104  Information 
developed under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act may now be used in a 
wider range of cases.105  Similarly, suspects will no longer be informed that they 
were under surveillance, even after the fact.106  Information developed by a grand 
jury may now be shared with intelligence agencies,107 and law enforcement officials 
are permitted to set up extended residence at a communications provider to monitor 
the communications of unauthorized users.108  This latter expansion of power was 
never even the subject of a Congressional hearing.109  The FBI may also review 
sensitive personal information, including medical, financial, mental health, and 
educational records, without having to show evidence of a crime and without a court 
order.110   
While the intent of the USA PATRIOT Act was to reduce the threat of future 
terrorist attacks by increasing national security, it also has the effect of significantly 
weakening the structure and limiting the coverage of many privacy protection 
statutes.111  Not only can the government use its expanded powers to combat 
terrorism, it can also use these powers against American citizens who are not under 
criminal investigation; against immigrants, who are within American borders legally; 
and against all those whose First Amendment activities are deemed to be national 
security threats by the Attorney General.112  Indeed, non-terrorist suspects are now 
subject to the government’s expanded ability to conduct secret searches in routine 
investigations wholly unrelated to terrorism.113   
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The passage of the USA PATRIOT Act evidences the circumscription of privacy 
rights following 9/11.  It has been described as the most sweeping expansion of 
government surveillance since the passage of the Communications Assistance for 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994.114  Similarly, the ACLU noted that “the USA 
PATRIOT Act gives enormous, unwarranted power to the executive branch 
unchecked by meaningful judicial review.”115  These changes have effectively 
increased the power of the government by reducing an individual’s protection against 
unwanted governmental intrusion into their personal lives. 116   
VI.  THE THREAT TO MEDICAL RECORDS PRIVACY 
“The experience of democracy is like the experience of life itself - always 
changing, infinite in its variety, sometimes turbulent and all the more 
valuable for having been tested by adversity.”117  -Jimmy Carter 
The three issues described above have converged to threaten medical records 
privacy.  First, the increased use of technology creates greater possibility for 
unauthorized access to personal health information.  Healthcare providers, insurance 
companies, employers and marketplace participants can use this information for 
discriminatory purposes.118  Second, the Privacy Rule, which was promulgated in an 
effort to address this threat, falls short of its goal because it sanctions the non-
consensual disclosure of personal health information.119  Third, privacy rights are 
further threatened by their severe restriction in the wake of the September 11 terrorist 
attacks, as evidenced by the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act.120   
The intersection of these events illustrates the tension between preserving 
individual privacy rights and protecting national security.  On one hand, legislators 
and the judiciary attempted to strengthen medical records privacy rights by passing 
the Privacy Rule.  On the other, the threat of terrorism dictated that national security 
be given greater priority.  Increased security has had the unfortunate by-product 
however, of decreasing individual privacy rights.  Because these opposing interests 
threaten medical records privacy, the proposed Privacy Rule must now be 
scrutinized, and in some cases reworked, to create meaningful privacy protections.  
Accordingly, this essay reconsiders the efficacy of the Privacy Rule in light of 
circumscribed and contracting privacy rights.   
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VII.  CRITICISM OF THE PRIVACY RULE 
“Lawyers come forward when there are great challenges.”121 
                                                                                -Alexis de Tocqueville  
A.  Is the Privacy Rule Unconstitutional? 
There is substantial justification for the argument that the Privacy Rule is 
unconstitutional under the Fourth and First Amendments.122  While this argument has 
never been adjudicated in court, it was presented in The Association of American 
Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. United States Department of Health and Human 
Services.123  The case was ultimately dismissed for lack of standing by the United 
States District for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, but the 
arguments presented illustrate the Privacy Rule’s susceptibility to a Constitutional 
challenge. 
1.  Fourth Amendment Claims 
Plaintiffs, The Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc., a 
Congressman, and three patients argued that the Privacy Rule violated the Fourth 
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable government searches and seizures.124  
Plaintiffs alleged that the Rule violates the Fourth Amendment by: (1) giving the 
government virtually unrestricted access to medical records without a warrant; (2) 
requiring that physicians aid government searches of patient records; and (3) 
facilitating the construction of a centralized government database of PHI without 
patient consent.125   
In disposing of the case the court found that “a number of unlikely events must 
occur in order for plaintiffs to sustain an injury.”126   The Secretary of HHS would 
have had to exercise his oversight responsibility under 45 C.F.R. §160.310(c) to 
request access to PHI, and would then have had to proceed directly against the 
“covered entity” that possessed the PHI in question.127  Even then, Plaintiffs’ 
particular PHI might not even have been accessed.128 
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As Plaintiffs’ PHI was not directly threatened, the Court concluded that 
Plaintiffs’ allegations against HHS were “highly speculative”129 and that Plaintiffs 
had neither established ripeness nor standing.130  Moreover, Plaintiffs failed to 
establish that the Privacy Rule had any immediate impact on them, that a legally 
protected interest had been invaded, or that they would suffer hardship resulting from 
the court’s failure to consider their claims.131 
The speculative nature of Plaintiffs’ injury however, is unique to the Association 
of American Physicians & Surgeons case.  As a counter-example, in Ferguson v. 
City of Charleston, infra, MUSC violated the Fourth Amendment by disclosing the 
results of diagnostic tests to local law enforcement without patient consent or a 
warrant.132  Under the current draft of the Privacy Rule, this same information could 
now be lawfully disclosed under the Rule’s provisions to prevent disease or child 
abuse.133  Similarly, if Plaintiff’s diagnostic test results had been transmitted 
electronically, the information would be subject to the USA PATRIOT Act, and 
could be accessed by the FBI without a court order under its authority to review 
medical information. 134   
These scenarios illustrate how the intersection of technology, the Privacy Rule 
and the USA PATRIOT Act abrogate privacy rights and violate the Fourth 
Amendment.  Ironically, information that was constitutionally protected before the 
promulgation of the Privacy Rule would be subject to non-consensual disclosure 
under a law designed specifically to increase privacy.  Clearly, there are situations 
where an application of the Privacy Rule would violate the Fourth Amendment 
prohibition against unreasonable searches, and where an injury under the Rule would 
not be speculative.  When the USA PATRIOT Act is added to the equation, the 
threat to medical records privacy becomes glaringly apparent.   
2.  First Amendment Claims 
Plaintiffs in Association of American Physicians & Surgeons also alleged that the 
Privacy Rule violated their First Amendment right to free speech.135  They argued 
that speech between patients and physicians was chilled by the mere existence of the 
Rule because patients were reluctant to speak freely with their physician.136  These 
allegations were dismissed as the Court found that they were subjective, and 
therefore non-actionable, and that Plaintiffs’ alleged injury could not be redressed by 
a favorable court decision.137   
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Ferguson provides an example of how an application of the Privacy Rule would 
violate the First Amendment right to free speech.  If Plaintiffs in Ferguson had failed 
to disclose their cocaine use to their physicians for fear that the information would be 
reported to government officials under the Rule’s child abuse provisions, Plaintiffs’ 
speech would have been chilled.138  This chilling effect would constitute an injury to 
Plaintiffs as a direct result of an application of the Privacy Rule because Plaintiffs 
would have failed to speak due to a fear of disclosure under the Rule.  Similarly, if 
Plaintiffs’ failure to disclose their addiction harmed the child and the harm could 
have been prevented by full disclosure, Plaintiffs would have been injured by an 
application of the Rule.  Finally, had Plaintiffs disclosed their cocaine addiction with 
the understanding that those communications were confidential, and Plaintiffs were 
subsequently arrested on the grounds of that communication and the urine test that 
followed, Plaintiffs would have been injured by an application of the Rule.  In these 
scenarios, a patient would be injured under the application of the Privacy Rule, 
which was promulgated in order to protect patient privacy. 
B.  If not Unconstitutional, the Privacy Rule is Ineffective 
While finding the Privacy Rule unconstitutional might require an unusual 
confluence of factors, it is nevertheless ineffective in achieving substantial medical 
records privacy.  First, the rate of technological change renders many of the Rule’s 
provisions obsolete.139  Second, the exceptions to the consent provisions subsume 
much of the privacy protection that might have otherwise been gained.  Third, the 
definition of a “covered entity” is so ambiguous that entities might deal with PHI but 
fall outside of the definition, and therefore not be subject to the Rule.  This 
ambiguity is of particular concern to consumers who might inadvertently disclose 
information under the mistaken belief that an entity is covered, when in fact it is not.  
Fourth, the Rule presents federalism questions that must be addressed because 
individual privacy has traditionally been a state function and the Privacy Rule is a 
federal regulation.  Finally, the government’s goal in passing the Privacy Rule was 
never to protect individual privacy rights.  Rather, Congress wanted to increase the 
portability of health information, thereby furthering corporate interests instead of 
protecting citizens against privacy violations.  The Privacy Rule was an afterthought 
included to more effectively market the mobility of health information.  Accordingly, 
while Congress recognized that privacy provisions were required to make medical 
records standardization palatable, it did not go far enough. 
1.  The Privacy Rule Is Behind the Times 
The Privacy Rule fails to address contemporary medical records storage and 
transmission practices because it was based on an outdated technology model.  The 
Rule was promulgated under the technology model of the mid-1990s when electronic 
health information was stored in large, centralized payer and provider systems.140  
Technological changes now allow that information to be stored in a common cyber-
space supported by Internet Service Providers (ISP’s) and accessed by Web 
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browsers.141  These changes facilitate the storage and transmission of vast amounts of 
data, but allow that same information to be accessed by anyone with a modem and a 
PC.142   
Similarly, the Privacy Rule fails to account for the prevalence of Internet use by 
healthcare consumers.  Indeed, the Internet is often the first destination for a patient 
recently diagnosed with a health problem.143  A patient may visit any of a number of 
healthcare Websites, many of which offer real-time interaction with physicians, 
health risk assessments, or up-to-date information on a multitude of medical 
conditions or healthcare questions.144  However, a patient must often submit a great 
deal of personal information to receive on-line advice.  That information is often left 
behind or can be traced to its source.  When collected and aggregated, this 
information creates a digital profile that reveals a great deal about an individual’s 
personal life, including her habits of association, speech and commerce.145     
The Privacy Rule does not address the use of the Internet as a healthcare venue 
where information is exchanged.  Many of the privacy policies espoused by health-
care websites fall short of consumers’ expectations.146  Some of these policies do not 
meet minimum fair-information practices, such as providing adequate notice, giving 
users control over their information, or holding the sites’ business partners to the 
same privacy standards.147  Others fail to follow their own stated privacy policies.148  
Nowhere in the Privacy Rule are these shortcomings appropriately addressed.   
Medical records, which were already too accessible in paper form, are now even 
less secure when stored and transmitted on the Internet.  The drafting of the Privacy 
Rule was an opportunity to create more stringent on-line security provisions, but that 
opportunity was squandered, leaving medical records exposed to potentially 
unauthorized use by anyone who can access the system.149  The shortcomings of the 
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Rule and its failure to address changes in the storage and transmission of medical 
records render it “behind the times,” grossly inadequate and obsolete.150   
2.  Exceptions Swallow Additional Privacy Protections 
The efficacy of the Privacy Rule is severely diminished because of the numerous 
instances when patient consent is not required for a disclosure of PHI.  For example, 
non-consensual disclosures of PHI explicitly contemplated in the Privacy Rule 
include but are not limited to, disclosure: 
• to an employer regarding an evaluation of the workplace, a work related 
illness, or workplace medical surveillance;151   
• to the FDA to conduct post marketing surveillance, track products, or report 
biological product deviations;152   
• to telemarket or mail ‘health related products or services’ and ‘other 
products of nominal value;’153 
• to authorized patients pursuant to a court order, subpoena or other court 
order;154 
• to a person who may have been exposed to a communicable disease or is at 
risk of spreading the disease;155      
• to authorities about victims of abuse, neglect or domestic violence;156 
• to report child abuse or neglect;157 
• to oversee healthcare systems, government benefit programs, entities 
subject to government regulatory programs, or entities subject to civil rights 
laws;158   
• under a waiver from an Institutional Review Board or a privacy board 
according to a series of considerations;159 or 
• to prevent or control disease.160 
While many of these disclosures might appear legitimate, their scope is so broad 
that they abrogate a substantial portion of the privacy rights the Rule was intended to 
create.  It is too easy to use any of these reasons as a pretense to disclose PHI without 
patient consent.    
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Other non-consensual disclosure situations contemplated by the rule are even less 
legitimate. For example, allowing the non-consensual disclosure of PHI to 
telemarket or mail ‘health related products or services’ and ‘other products of 
nominal value’ belies Congressional favoritism for commercial interests.161  This 
provision neither bolsters patient privacy nor furthers any articulated public policy.  
Similarly, allowing the non-consensual disclosure of PHI to law enforcement 
officials does not infuse a patient with confidence that her personal medical 
information will remain carefully guarded by her physician.  Under-age drinkers, 
drug users, HIV-positive individuals who have not practiced safe sex, and people 
who may be a danger to themselves or others might avoid getting needed healthcare 
for fear that evidence of any crime would be a reason to disclose the information to 
the police.162  These scenarios are similar to the Ferguson case, and illustrate the 
“docs to cops” scenario where information given to a physician in confidence is 
subsequently used in a criminal investigation.163  They also illustrate how the Privacy 
Rule chills communication between a doctor and patient as a reasonable patient 
might not disclose certain information if she feared arrest and criminal 
prosecution.164   
Even if a patient does consent to the use or disclosure of PHI, that consent may 
be neither informed nor consensual.165  Generally, the consent must: (1) be in plain 
language, (2) inform the individual that PHI may be used and disclosed to carry out 
specified activities, (3) indicate that the individual can revoke the consent in writing, 
and, (4) state that the individual may request that the “covered entity” restrict how 
PHI is used or disclosed for health care purposes (though the “covered entity” is not 
required to agree).166  These provisions are insufficient because a patient might, 
during the first visit to a physician, sign a consent form that applies to all future 
disclosures and uses.  The patient would not likely know the information she 
consented to disclose because she typically would not know what is currently in the 
records.167  Further, it would be impossible for her to know information that might be 
contained in future records.168  Similarly, a patient might be coerced into consenting 
to disclose PHI as healthcare providers may refuse treatment to a patient who fails to 
sign an authorization form.169  Clearly, the “consent” to disclose PHI might be 
neither informed nor consensual.   
The effectiveness of the Privacy Rule is further curtailed because the 
requirements for patient consent before a disclosure of PHI are not stringent enough.  
The stated goal of the Privacy Rule was to protect patient privacy by requiring 
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consent before a disclosure of PHI.  Specifying situations in which non-consensual 
disclosure of PHI is permitted severely reduces the privacy rights that might have 
been gained.  Furthermore, a signed patient consent form must be viewed as suspect 
because it might not be truly informed, and might have been signed under duress.  
Either way, these limitations impair a patient’s ability to control access to her PHI.170 
3.  The Nebulous Nature of a “Covered Entity” 
Many healthcare activities are outside the coverage of the Privacy Rule because 
they fall into the “gray zone” between traditional healthcare and what the new law 
covers.171  By its own terms, the Privacy Rule applies to “covered entities,” which 
consist of healthcare providers, healthcare plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and the 
business associates of any of these entities.172  While these terms might seem clear at 
first blush, ambiguity lurks just below the surface.  For example, an entity that 
appears to be covered might not be if it does not submit claims electronically.173  
Providers who submit paper claims or patients who pay for care out of pocket are 
therefore not covered.174  Similarly, the extent to which a “healthcare clearinghouse” 
is covered is unclear.  For example, will all the information collected by a website be 
covered, or will coverage apply only to information collected for purposes of claims 
transmission?175  Much of this ambiguity remains unresolved and will probably only 
be clarified through court action.   
The drafters of the Privacy Rule attempted to mitigate some of this ambiguity by 
covering an entity’s “business associates.”176  A “business associate” assists a 
“covered entity” in a function involving the use or disclosure of PHI.177  The 
“covered entity” is responsible for the conduct of its “business associates,”178 and if 
the “covered entity” fails to address a known violation it is deemed to have violated 
the rule.179  While this allows HHS to regulate downstream users of PHI,180 it creates 
as many problems as it solves by forcing the renegotiation of hundreds of thousands 
of contracts.181   
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The ambiguous definition of a “covered entity” and its “business associates” also 
potentially restricts speech about an individual’s PHI.182  For example, a consumer 
might be confused over whether an activity is regulated by the Privacy Rule.183  This 
would be most common in internet transactions where a consumer might disclose 
personal health information under the mistaken belief that the website was 
covered.184  Conversely, the ambiguity might make a patient reluctant to discuss 
medical conditions with legitimate members of the healthcare community, including 
physicians.  Ferguson addressed this concern, noting that “an intrusion on that 
expectation [of privacy] may have adverse consequences because it may deter 
patients from receiving needed medical care.”185   
The failure to adequately define a “covered entity” is not necessarily damning for 
the Privacy Rule, but it does create unnecessary confusion.  The electronic 
transmission requirement limits entities that are actually covered.  Similarly, the 
extent to which information processed by “healthcare clearinghouses” is covered is 
unclear.  This lack of clarity could have adverse consequences for consumers who 
might inadvertently disclose personal health information to entities that are not 
covered.  Conversely, consumers might be less willing to speak candidly with 
legitimate and covered healthcare providers for fear that they are not covered.   
4.  Federalism Concerns 
The Privacy Rule has unresolved federalism conflicts because it seeks to 
nationalize individual privacy rights, which have traditionally been a state concern.  
The Rule creates a nationally uniform “floor” of privacy protections by providing 
that the federal regulation will not preempt state laws that are more stringent in 
protecting patient privacy.186  The common law physician-patient privilege illustrates 
however, that the protection of individual medical privacy has traditionally been a 
state concern.187  The intersection of these interests clearly has federalism 
implications because state and federal interests collide.188  
Resolving the federalism issue will involve balancing the Supremacy Clause189 
against the 10th Amendment,190 and the Supremacy Clause will likely prevail.  Some 
academics have argued that the regulation of health information privacy should 
remain within the ambit of traditional state power.191  This proposal is problematic 
however, because it creates multiple standards.  For instance, individuals in some 
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states will enjoy greater privacy protections than in others.  Similarly, “covered 
entities” will be required to adhere to both national and State privacy standards.192  
Tipping the balance in favor of adopting a uniform federal regulation are changes in 
the healthcare industry that make medical records transmission a subject of interstate 
commerce.  As the District Court noted in The Association of American Physicians 
and Surgeons, the Privacy Rule regulates interstate economic activity because 
healthcare plans operate across state lines.193  Accordingly, Congress will likely be 
able to invoke its Commerce Clause powers to nationally regulate the transmission 
of medical records.194   
The creation of multiple privacy standards also reveals inconsistencies within the 
Privacy Rule.  The goal of HIPAA was the administrative simplification of the 
healthcare system.195  The Rule controverts this goal however, by creating multiple 
privacy standards.  Rather than simplifying the provision of healthcare, the two-
tiered approach to privacy protection complicates the provision of healthcare because 
providers and must comply with both national and regional privacy standards.   
The benefit of enacting a uniform national privacy standard was further 
exemplified in United States ex rel. Mary Jane Stewart v. The Louisiana Clinic 
where the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana easily 
circumvented a state law that was allegedly more stringent than the federal 
standard.196  Relators in a qui tam action alleged that Defendants defrauded the 
federal government by presenting false claims for medical service reimbursements.  
Defendants, in an effort to protect patient privacy, sought a protective order 
concerning the disclosure of patient billing and medical records.197  They argued that 
they were subject to civil liability under a Louisiana law preventing the disclosure of 
those records, and that this law was not pre-empted by the Privacy Rule because it 
exceeded the federal standard.198   
In requiring that the PHI in question be produced in unredacted form, the court 
found that the Louisiana statute was not more stringent than the federal standard 
because the Louisiana law did not address “the form, substance, or the need for 
express legal permission from an individual” as required by the Privacy Rule.199  
Because the Louisiana law did not fit explicitly within the exception carved out by 
the Privacy Rule, the “stringency” exception did not apply.  Defendants were 
therefore required to produce unredacted PHI containing patient identifiers.200  In an 
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effort to protect the confidential nature of this information the court limited 
recipients to counsel of record, two paralegals and one expert for each party.201  The 
limitation was ineffective however, because the court also concluded that the United 
States could use information gained in this discovery proceeding in connection with 
its oversight of healthcare activities.     
The impact of this case is threefold.  First, it illustrates the benefit of a nationally 
uniform privacy standard because the addition of the state law caused unnecessary 
confusion. Absent the state law- federal law controversy, the controlling authority 
would be clear and the case likely would not have been litigated.  Second, the case 
illustrates how easily the “stringency” provision of the Privacy Rule can be 
circumvented.  Accordingly, this provision creates an ineffective distinction between 
allegedly more stringent State standards and the national Privacy Rule.  Third, the 
decision illustrates the Rule’s shortcoming in protecting individual medical records 
privacy.  While the court sought to limit the disclosure of PHI to counsel of record, 
two paralegals and one expert for each party, once the PHI is used for government 
oversight purposes the number of people who could potentially view the unredacted 
PHI in question is limitless. 
5.  Congress was Catering to Corporate Interests 
A final problem with the Privacy Rule is its suspect motivation.  The Rule was 
passed in an effort to mitigate the consequences of standardizing and streamlining 
medical records202 rather than to advance individual privacy interests.203  It 
exemplifies an attempt to balance community interests against individual rights,204 
illustrating compromises between privacy advocates and industry leaders.205  While 
these compromises were made in an effort to placate those concerned about 
unwarranted access to medical records, it is important to recall that the Rule does not 
represent beneficent government action to protect the privacy of personal health 
information.206  Rather it is an example of Congress putting “big-money corporate 
interests ahead of the basic privacy interests of the American people.”207  In 
considering the efficacy of the Privacy Rule, it is therefore illuminating to recall that 
it was an afterthought on the heels of administrative simplification.  This commercial 
favoritism, exemplified by permitting the non-consensual disclosure of PHI for 
marketing and fundraising purposes,208 can be explained by government officials 
who succumbed to powerful lobbying groups that have a stake in obtaining personal 
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health information.209  While this situation is typical, it is nevertheless important to 
recall that the government had a pre-textual profiteering motive and was not acting 
simply to protect individual privacy rights.   
VII.  ALL IS NOT LOST 
“Change is not made without inconvenience, even from worse to 
better.”210        -Richard Hooker 
The Privacy Rule fails to address significant issues regarding the erosion of 
medical records privacy.  These gaps result from the confluence of increased 
technology use in medical records storage, the enactment of the Privacy Rule, and 
the restriction of privacy rights following 9/11, as evidenced by the passage of the 
USA PATRIOT Act.  While the Privacy Rule was ostensibly promulgated in order to 
protect medical records privacy, its provisions do not go far enough.  First, the Rule 
is based on an out-of-date technology model.  Second, the exceptions to the patient 
consent provisions swallow much of the privacy protection that would have been 
gained.  Third, the Rule fails to adequately define a “covered entity.”  Fourth, it has 
unresolved federalist issues. Finally, the supposed privacy protections are suspect 
because Congress was catering to corporate interests rather than protecting 
individual rights.  Despite these obstacles to creating effective medical records 
privacy, the government can still protect privacy rights while advancing national 
security interests.211   
One of the clearest solutions to problems in the current draft of the Privacy Rule 
is to change the offending provisions.  For instance, the narrow definition of a 
“covered entity,” which allows some entities that deal with PHI to fall outside its 
coverage, could be broadened to include any entity that deals with PHI.  This change 
would truly protect personal health information by requiring any entity that deals 
with it to follow the strictures of the Privacy Rule.  A broader definition would 
facilitate enforcement of the Rule by clarifying the guidelines.  It would also reduce 
patient confusion because patients could be secure in their knowledge that any entity 
to which they submitted PHI would be subject to the Privacy Rule.   
Similarly, the conditions under which PHI may be disclosed without patient 
consent should be narrowed to include only those instances where non-consensual 
disclosure is absolutely necessary.  While there are clearly instances when non-
consensual disclosure of PHI is required, those instances must be strictly limited if 
the Privacy Rule is to have any substantial effect.   
The decision to disclose PHI without patient consent should be considered 
against the backdrop of the physician-patient privilege.  This tradition protects 
conversations between physician and patient and clearly exists because of the 
intimate nature of personal health information.  The legislature should defer to 
tradition in this instance, treading carefully before abrogating this important and 
fundamental duty of confidentiality.  Similarly, legislators should be particularly 
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careful to protect the privacy of personal health information in light of the threat to 
medical records privacy posed by the increased use of technology.  They should 
recognize the relevance of a long-standing protection, and utilize it to account for 
continuing changes in the use of technology.   
Technology however, can be used to increase medical records security.  In 
passing HIPAA, Congress recognized the shift to electronic storage and transmission 
of medical records.  In addition to allowing for the standardizing and streamlining of 
medical records, this shift also provides an opportunity to implement sound data 
handling practices throughout the healthcare industry.212  Technology companies 
currently have available privacy enhancing features such as encryption, on-line opt-
in buttons, and anonomymizers that can be used to increase security on the web, in e-
mail transmissions, and in data storage.213  These devices should be used to increase 
the security of personal health information, which will facilitate greater medical 
records privacy by carefully controlling who has access to information storage and 
transmission systems and how such access is regulated.   
Because the judiciary will ultimately interpret enforcement of the Privacy Rule, it 
should be drafted to consistently protect medical records privacy.  This may be 
accomplished by upholding a patient’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”214  The 
current draft of the Rule moved in that direction by establishing a “floor” of privacy 
protections, but the solidity of this “floor” is questionable because it has unresolved 
federalism issues.  Congress might therefore be justified in pre-empting State 
legislation on medical records privacy issues under the Commerce Clause, which 
would eliminate discrepant standards between States, facilitate compliance by 
“covered entities,” and provide patients with a uniform standard of protection.     
In changing the text of the Privacy Rule, HHS might also consider internal 
restructuring in order to more effectively deal with privacy issues.  For instance, 
HHS could create a system similar to the issuing of a temporary restraining order 
where a “covered entity” must contact a judge or regulatory agency before disclosing 
PHI without patient consent.  That judge or agency could be empowered to quickly 
decide whether the non-consensual disclosure of PHI is warranted.  Similarly, HHS 
could appoint regional staff members who would be consulted about non-consensual 
disclosures of PHI.  HHS could also create a sub-agency to deal specifically with 
medical records privacy issues.  These new agencies or staff members might operate 
as a board, or as a quasi-judicial system that would decide whether non-consensual 
disclosures of PHI are warranted.  Whatever form this institution would take, its goal 
should be to ensure that a patient’s reasonable expectation of privacy remains 
relatively constant. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
“Law is order, and good law is good order.”215                              -Aristotle 
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The protection of medical records privacy is an important and pervasive issue.  
While individual privacy rights had expanded prior to 9/11, they have been severely 
restricted following those tragic events.  In light of contracting privacy rights, the 
protection of medical records privacy becomes even more important, particularly 
when one considers that privacy is more easily subject to transgression as a result of 
the increased use of technology to store and transmit medical records, and the 
enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act.  Accordingly, the Privacy Rule, which was 
promulgated in an effort to protect individual medical privacy rights, must be re-
examined to ascertain whether it can withstand these new challenges. 
Upon re-examination of the Privacy Rule, its shortcomings become glaringly 
apparent.  While this does not mean that the Privacy Rule must be discarded, it 
indicates that the Rule must be altered if substantial privacy protection is to be 
preserved.  These alterations include broadening the scope of the Rule and requiring 
that currently available technology security devices be utilized to substantially 
protect the privacy of medical records.  Congress should also consider pre-empting 
State privacy protections in favor of a uniform national standard, as well as 
restructuring agencies in order to provide meaningful privacy protection.  Through 
this continued re-tooling of the Privacy Rule, Congress can defend against the 
tripartite threat to medical records privacy, and in so doing preserve individual 
privacy, dignity and autonomy.   
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